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Abstract-In this paper, algorithms on distributed resource
(spectrum and power) sharing for relay stations are investigated
for downlink transmissions in an OFDMA-based relay-aided cell.
Both system capacity and user fairness are considered. By group-
ing the relay stations into coalitions according to the set of users
they are relaying, the optimal resource allocation can be solved by
considering resource allocation within and among the coalitions.
The algorithm for intra-coalition resource allocation is proposed
by utilizing the key observation: for each data symbol transmitted
from the base station to a user (in a subcarrier), only one among
all the available relay stations is required to relay the symbol.
The inter-coalition resource allocation is modeled by both a non-
cooperative and a cooperative game, where the cooperative game
is solved by a nonsymmetric Nash bargaining solution. Simulation
results show that the non-cooperative algorithm outperforms
random allocation by approximately 50% in system capacity
with 3 relay stations in each coalition. The cooperative algorithm
has approximately 5% loss in system capacity comparing with
the non-cooperative algorithm, but achieves a significant gain in
terms of fairness performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Both orthogonal frequency division multiple access
(OFDMA) and relaying are regarded as leading candidates for
future generation cellular networks [1], [2]. OFDMA serves
as a promising multiple-access technique for high-data-rate
transmissions while relaying helps to increase system capacity,
transmission reliability, as well as coverage. In an OFDMA
relaying network, the base station (BS) first sends out data
symbols which are carried by subcarriers, and relay stations
(RS) retransmit these data symbols carried by their own
subcarriers; most likely in different frequency bands and in
a different order to explore multiuser diversity and utilize
frequency selective fading channels. In this paperl , based on
the estimated channel conditions of the multiuser downlinks,
we investigate a distributed optimal spectrum sharing and
power allocation strategy for the RSs in a decode-and-forward
OFDMA-based relaying system in terms of both total system
capacity and user fairness.
OFDMA resource allocation without relaying is well re-
ported in the literature [3], [4], [5], [6], while relaying cases
1The work reported in this paper has formed part of the Delivery Efficiency
Core Research Programme of the Virtual Centre of Excellence in Mobile and
Personal Communications, Mobile VCE, www.mobilevce.com.This research
has been funded by EPSRC and by the Industrial Companies who are
Members of Mobile VCE. Fully detailed technical reports on this research
are available to Industrial Members of Mobile VCE.
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have only been considered in a number of limited scenarios
due to their high complexity [7], [8], [9]. All the previous
works in OFDMA relaying either do not consider the resource
allocation problem or make unrealistic assumptions to simplify
the problem. In [10], [11], [12], the authors take a different
approach and make use of the concept of bargaining in game
theory to model subcarrier sharing among the user equipment
(UE) for the OFDMA downlink/uplink transmissions (without
relaying). The concept of a Nash bargaining solution is used
in these studies, which provides a fair operation point in a
distributed implementation.
Our approach differs from previous work since we consider
practical assumptions on relaying scenarios. RSs are assumed
to have individual power constraints and they use the same
or different frequency spectrum for relaying (Le., sensed by
cognitive radio). Some RSs may be designated to the same
set of UEs and they have shared objectives, while some RSs
may be designated to a completely different set of UEs and
they may compete among each other for the shared resource.
Such a system can be naturally modeled as a game. Greedy
subcarrier and power allocation schemes for each RS-UE link
are smartly chosen to explore the global resource utilization
efficiency in improving capacity and fairness.
We group the set of RSs designated to the same set of
UEs into a coalition. The optimal resource allocation of the
whole system is then divided into two subproblems: (1) how
to share the spectrum and allocate power among the RSs in
the same coalition, and (2) how to share the spectrum among
different coalitions. For the first subproblem, we prove that the
optimal resource allocation theorem for the relaying network
proposed in our previous work [9] still holds under the new
assumptions. A greedy algorithm is proposed. For the second
subproblem, we first model it as a non-cooperative game and
show that under good channel conditions, it converges fast.
We then model the game as a cooperative bargaining problem
and nonsymmetric Nash bargaining solutions are utilized for
the weighted fairness among the coalitions. The proposed
algorithms have low complexity and simulation results show
that they effectively enhance the total capacity and maintain
the user fairness.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our
relaying network model. In Section III, the preliminaries in
game theory are introduced and the problem is formulated
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using game theory. In Sections IV, V and VI, we investigate
the resource allocation problems both intra-coalition and inter-
coalition. Section VII evaluates the performance of these
algorithms. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VITI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
This paper investigates the problem of resource allocation
in an OFDMA-based relaying wireless network. OFDMA
downlink transmissions (with N data subcarriers) in a single
cell are studied. The system consists of one base station (BS),
K mobile users or user equipment (UE) and L relay stations
(RS), and each is equipped with a single antenna. Inter-
cell interference is not considered in the additive Gaussian
noise. Let U = {u1, ... , UK} denote the set of UEs, and
R = {rl' ... , r L} denote the set of RSs. Unlike most previous
work, we consider a practical and flexible relaying scenario
based on fixed relays. As shown in Figure l(a), each RS
r i relays for some UEs Ui ~ U. The set of UEs Ui can be
determined in many ways, for example location proximity or
the UEs who pay for the relaying service. In the case that
some RSs use the same spectrum to relay for different UEs,
the interference to each other is considered as noise. The set
of RSs who relay for UE Ui is denoted as R i ~ R, Le., a UE
may have more than one RS that is dedicated to relay for it.
The relaying scenario works as follows. The BS firstly trans-
mits information symbols to UEs, and RSs also decode the
symbols and retransmit them (decode-and-forward relaying) in
different time slots or frequency bands (free spectrum chunks
detected by cognitive radio [13]). We assume that channel
gains between the BS and RSs are high enough (e.g., selective
decode-and-forwarding is performed) so that the probability of
a decoding error at each RS is small regardless of the power
and modulation schemes adopted at the BS. RSs select and
allocate different spectrum (subcarriers) and power for each
UE to utilize the multiuser diversity, as shown in Figure 1(b).
Perfect channel state information at the receivers is as-
sumed, and it is fed back to the senders (BS or RSs).The RSs
negotiate with the UEs after the subcarrier allocation so that
the UEs are able to correctly combine the relayed symbols with
the symbol sent by the BS for better decoding. We also assume
that UEs send back to the BS the information of combine
channels (e.g. combined signal-to-noise ratio). This allows the
BS to exploit adaptive modulation and coding schemes to
improve system capacity.
B. Nonsymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution
Similar to the NBS, the nonsymmetric Nash bargaining
solution [14], [15] satisfies,
III. GAME THEORY CONCEPTS AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
Game theory aims to study the interactions among a set
of decision makers, called players. The resource allocation
problem is similar to a bargaining problem in game theory,
where a set of decision makers bargain among themselves for
some shared resource. In this section, we will first introduce
the basic concepts of game theory and then formulate the
problem.
n
A. Nash Bargaining Solution
Let N = {I, ... , n} denote the set of players and let F
denote a closed and convex subset of Rn , representing the set
of feasible payoff allocations that the players can get if they all
work together. Let d = (d1, ... , dn ) denote the disagreement
payoff allocation that the players would expect if they did not
cooperate, and suppose that {y E FIYi ~ di, 'Vi E N} is a
nonempty bounded set. The pair (F, d) is called an n-person
bargaining problem [14].
Definition 1: A solution to the bargaining problem (F, d),
¢(F, d), is called a Nash bargaining solution (NBS), if the
following axioms are satisfied [14].
1) Weak Pareto Efficiency: there is no other vector y E F
such that Yi > ¢i(F, d) for every i in N.
2) Individual Rationality: ¢(F, d) 2:: d.
3) Scale Covariance: For any linear transformation 'ljJ of F,
¢('ljJ(F), 'ljJ(d)) = 7jJ(¢(F, d)).
4) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For any closed
convex Q ~ F, if ¢(Q, d) E Q, then ¢(Q, d) = ¢(F, d).
5) Symmetry: if F is invariant under all exchanges of
agents, then ¢i(F,d) = ¢j(F,d), 'Vi,j EN.
There is exactly one bargaining solution that satisfies the
above axioms, which is the NBS, stated in the following
theorem [14].
Theorem 1: There is a unique solution function ¢(F, d)
that satisfies all five axioms in Definition 1, and the solution
satisfies,
n
¢(F, d) E arg max II (Xi - di)Wi , (2)
XEF,x~d i=l
where Wi represents the weight of player i and L~l Wi = 1.
Definition 2: A dictatorial solution [15] of player i,
¢P (F, d), represents the optimal utility of player i by as-
suming all other players adopting the strategies to achieve the
utilities at the disagreement point d.
Definition 3: A solution to the bargaining problem (F, d),
¢(F, d), is called a nonsymmetric Nash bargaining solution
(NNBS) , if the following axioms are satisfied [15].
1) Weak Pareto Efficiency.
1 2 3 4 N-2 N-1 N
OFDM Subcarrier Group
(b) Subcarrier allocation at RS l(a) A relay-aided cell
Fig. 1. Relaying scenario
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2Although it is more natural to define the players as the set of DEs U,
allowing DEs to bargain among each other is not efficient for a power-limited
device and the fairness is also hard to control with the possibility of malicious
players.
where ¢f (F, d) are dictatorial solutions.
It is proven in [15] that, when d = 0, a NNBS corresponds
to the solution for weighted proportional fairness by solving
maxXEF E~lWi log Xi.
c. Problem Formulation
Given the definitions and properties of various solutions to
a bargaining problem, we formally formulate our problem in
this section.
We define the set of players as the set of RSs n 2 with size
L. The utility v(ri) of the RS i is defined as,
members. If the assumption does not hold, each coalition will
not be able to purely consider other coalitions as a competitive
relationship because some of its member may also belong to
other coalitions. This will further complicate the situation and
is beyond the scope of this paper.
In the following sections, we will firstly discuss how the
utility shall be shared within the coalition and how the power
shall be allocated. We will then discuss both non-cooperative
and cooperative solutions for resource sharing among coali-
tions.
3Note that although the RSs share the same spectrum, in Theorem 3 (intra-
coalition), we assume that the RSs do not interfere with each other by not
allocating same subcarrier to different DEs. This is because they may have
strong interference to each other due to location proximity. For inter-coalition
resource allocation in later sections, this assumption is relaxed.
IV. RESOURCE ALLOCATION WITHIN COALITIONS
The resource allocation, especially the subcarrier allocation
problem, is a combinatorial matching problem that is known to
be NP-complete. Before we introduce the detailed distributed
resource allocation algorithm, we firstly show several theorems
which can greatly reduce the complexity of the resource
allocation strategy.
The following theorem is cited from our previous work in
[9].
Theorem 2: In the general situation, for a relaying network
where the number of subcarriers K is much larger than the
number of RSs L, and L is a small integer value, there is
approximately only one RS l among all L RSs that needs to
relay for any subcarrier transmitted from the BS. The optimal
power allocation is water-filling by considering power from
other RSs as noise.
Theorem 2 states that, within a coalition S, for any subcar-
rier from the BS to a UE that is dedicated to this coalition,
the optimal solution only requires one RS to relay for this
subcarrier among all the RSs in the coalition S. It is obvious
that the optimal power allocation scheme is actually a Nash
equilibrium. However, the theorem has an assumption that the
RSs strictly use different spectrum and that they strictly do
not interfere with each other.
We assume in this paper that RSs may share, and most likely
do share the same spectrum 3, especially for the RSs in the
same coalition (due to the possible location proximity). We
extend the above theorem as follows.
Theorem 3: The maximum capacity C2max under the as-
sumption of RSs using the same frequency spectrum for
transmissions is equal to the maximum capacity Clmax under
the assumption of RSs using different frequency spectrum
for transmissions; and their power allocation schemes are the
same, provided that the subcarriers have already been allocated
in the same way for both scenarios.
Proof: Due to space limitation, we only give a simple
proof based on intuition. It is natural to see that in the
assumption that RSs use different spectrum, maximal ratio
combining (MRC) can be applied at the UEs. Thus, given
the same subcarrier and power allocations, it will always be
(3)
(5)
(4)v(ri) = L R(u),
UEUi
n
¢(F, d) 2 L Wi¢P (F, d),
i=l
2) Individual Rationality.
3) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
4) Disagreement Point Convexity (DPC): let x= ¢(F, d)
be a solution outcome, then the disagreement point d' =
(1 - A)d + AX leads to the same outcome.
5) Domination of Weighted Dictatorial Solution
(DWD(w)): with weights E~=l Wi = 1, a solution
¢(F, d) is domination of weighted dictatorial solution
if,
which is the summation of the information rates of the DEs
that it relays for. The information rate R(Uj) for UE Uj
is defined by the summation of the Shannon capacity of
each subcarrier by considering the BS-UE signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR), as well as the RS-DE SNR, where the signals from
other RSs that do not relay for this subcarrier are treated as
interference.
We define a coalition S to be the group of RSs that relay
for the same subset of DEs, i.e., if U' is any subset of U, then,
The utility is transferable within a coalition because of the
continuous power allocation by water-filling (we will show
in the next section that water-filling is still optimal under
a relaying scenario). For example, if a RS ri gives up a
subcarrier for RS r j (both are in the same coalition), then
the increase in SNR of one subcarrier r j will result in the
increase of the water level and thus benefits all the users that
are relayed by rj.
There are potentially many coalitions in the network. We
further simplify the problem by assuming if two RSs r i and r j
relay for the same UE, then they have exactly the same subset
of UEs to relay for, i.e., Ui = Uj • Under this assumption, a
RS only belongs to one coalition. Thus, each coalition treats
itself as a "larger" player and competes with other coalitions
for resource. Any benefit to a coalition can be transferred to its
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superior to the assumption that RSs use the same spectrum.
However, since the optimal subcarrier allocation assumes
only one RS relays for a subcarrier, it is applicable to both
scenarios. Therefore, their optimal subcarrier allocations are
the same. The power allocations are also the same. •
Similar to the case in [9], when considering user fairness,
Theorem 3 still holds for any single DE. The RSs in a
coalition can simply adjust the power allocated to each user
to control any fairness scheme such as max-min fairness [4]
or proportional fairness [6].
A simple and efficient greedy algorithm CoalitionAllocate()
based on the previous analysis is described as follows. The
aim of the algorithm is to allocate subcarriers and power at
each RS to maximize the capacity of all the DEs serviced by
the RSs in a coalition; user fairness can also be optionally
maintained.
1) Assume power is proportional to the number of subcar-
riers allocated to the relay for a VE at each RS.
2) For each subcarrier from the BS to the DE, find the best
subcarrier among all which have not been allocated for
the DE by comparing a combination of both water-level
and channel condition at each subcarrier.
3) According to the fairness scheme, iteratively adjust the
power and recalculate the information rates for each VE,
until the maximum step has been reached or the fairness
criteria is matched.
The algorithm has a running time proportional to the number
of UEs serviced by the coalition, as well as the amount
of adjustments for fairness maintenance. The key idea is to
greedily match the best RS to the DE using Theorem 3. Note
that this algorithm is a centralized algorithm. It requires a
selected RS to act as a coalition decision maker. The RS needs
to overhear the information feedback from DEs to other RSs
in the same coalition before the algorithm can be executed.
V. NON-COOPERATIVE RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In this section, we consider the non-cooperative resource
allocation among coalitions. The algorithm can be run on
the selected coalition decision makers for distributed spectrum
sharing of coalitions. As mentioned in previous sections, the
relationship among coalitions is competitive. The objective of
the non-cooperative scheme is to reach the Nash equilibrium in
a non-cooperative game where no RS can change its subcarrier
allocation alone to benefit himself.
For a distributed system, such an equilibrium has to be
reached in rounds. Due to space limitation, we only describe
the basic idea below. Each coalition distributively and locally
allocates the resource (the algorithm described in Coalition-
Allocate() using known channel conditions based on all other
coalitions' decision so far in tum. After a coalition makes
a decision, it informs other coalitions about its decision for
information update. The process terminates when either a
predefined maximum running round or an equilibrium has
reached.
Due to the discrete nature of the subcarrier allocation, this
algorithm may not reach the equilibrium. However, when the
total bandwidth of the RSs is not smaller than the bandwidth
of the BS, and when the channel conditions of all RSs are
good (which is most likely satisfied due to the multiuser
diversity), the algorithm converges fast. This is because if a
coalition 8 1 uses a frequency band, it is not likely for another
coalition 82 who makes decision later to make use of the
same frequency band, unless the interference caused by the
coalition 81 is negligible. In the later case, at the next round
of execution of coalition 8 1, the decision from coalition 8 2
in the previous round is unlikely to affect 81 's decision due
to small levels of interference. Note that this algorithm may
give supreme priority to the coalition that starts first. Fairness
among coalitions are hardly obtained.
VI. COOPERATIVE RESOURCE ALLOCATION
We now discuss the cooperative resource allocation among
coalitions. The aim of cooperation is to maximize the total
capacity of VEs in each coalition while keeping fairness
among the coalitions.
We choose to make use of the NNBS, which maximizes
rr~=1 (Xi - di)Wi and maintains weighted proportional fairness
among the coalitions. For each coalition i, we define its weight
Wi as the percentage of the subcarriers or DEs that it relays
over the total number of subcarriers from the BS (or the total
number of VEs). A coalition relaying for more DEs should
have higher priority. When the weighted fairness is maintained
among the coalitions and each coalition also maintains its
own fairness among DEs as shown in CoalitionAllocate(), the
fairness among VEs is also maintained.
Observe that, for a convex solution space F, the NNBS
satisfies the axiom DWD(111) in Definition 3. When d = 0, it
is easy to see that,
¢(F, d) 2: (w1¢f(F, d), ... ,wn¢~(F,d)) (6)
The dictatorial point is easy to obtain locally. Assuming
d = 0, each coalition can simply apply CoalitionAllocate() by
assuming there is no interference from other RSs to obtain its
dictatorial point. Therefore, by applying Equation 6, the lower
bound of the optimal solution can be obtained.
We propose the algorithm in Figure 2. The key idea of
this algorithm is to let the coalitions who lead the bound
most "help" those who lag the bound most by exchanging
and reallocating their subcarriers. Each coalition shall locally
calculate its own dictatorial solution. The system initialization
can be either randomized, or using non-cooperative resource
allocation shown in Section V.
Since this is a distributed algorithm, the step that reallocates
subcarriers among the two sets of coalitions may require a
large number of information exchanges. There are two ways
to reduce such complexity. The coalitions that are not adjacent
to each other (thus have negligible interference to each other)
may be neglected from such subcarrier reallocation. Alterna-
tively, as proposed in [10], a solution based on the Hungarian
method firstly finds a matching pair and then lets only the two
pairs exchange and reallocate subcarriers.
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL. Downloaded on January 13, 2009 at 10:53 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
Fig. 3. Simulation Results
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, resource allocation strategies have been inves-
tigated in an OFDMA-based relaying network. The system was
modeled as a game where RSs with the same objectives are
grouped into coalitions. The detailed algorithms on how the
subcarriers and power can be allocated within each coalition,
and how the subcarriers can be shared among the coalitions,
were discussed. Both non-cooperative and cooperative solu-
tions based on the NNBS were proposed for inter-coalition
resource allocation. Simulation results showed that the coop-
erative algorithm had a 5% loss in system capacity comparing
with the non-cooperative algorithm with 3 RSs in each coali-
tion, but achieved a significant gain by approximately 25% in
terms of fairness performance.
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Cooperative Resource Allocation
for each coalition Si
call CoalitionAllocateO
calculate the weighted dictatorial solution Wi¢p (F, d)
initialize the system
while maximum adjustment step has not reached
form a set of coalitions such that they are
the top n in exceeding their weighted dictatorial solution
form a set of coalitions such that they are
the last m in exceeding their weighted dictatorial solution
do subcarrier reallocation between these two sets
for each coalition Si
call CoalitionAllocateO
(a) System capacity (b) Fairness perfromance
VII. SIMULATION
We set up the simulations as follows. In the relaying
downlink transmissions, the total bandwidth is chosen to be
5MHz, and the number of data subcarriers is 300, which
are parameters used in the LTE OFDMA downlink system
[16]. The wireless channel is modeled as a frequency-selective
channel consisting of six independent Rayleigh fading paths.
For simplicity of simulation, we assume the total bandwidth
of all the RS is the same as that of the BS. We evaluate both
the performance of non-cooperative and cooperative solutions
by varying the size of the coalitions and the numbers of RSs
and DEs inside each coalition.
We also assume that the BS does not apply any resource
allocation to compare the effectiveness of the algorithms on
the RSs. The RSs (either in the same coalition or in different
coalitions) are set to have the same path fading to all DEs. The
resource allocation inside each coalition has a fairness criteria
such that each DE in the coalition has the same priority. Jain's
fairness index [17] is adopted to measure fairness of difference
resource allocation schemes.
The simulation results for 2 coalitions and 3 DEs for each
coalition are shown in Figure 3 (varying the number of RSs in
each coalition). Although the RSs have individual power con-
straints, their total power is kept constant for fair comparison.
It can be seen that both non-cooperative and cooperative sub-
carrier allocation strategies outperform the random resource
allocation strategy in system capacity. The non-cooperative
algorithm outperforms random allocation by approximately
50% in system capacity with 3 RSs in each coalition. The
cooperative algorithm has approximately 5% loss in system
capacity comparing with the non-cooperative algorithm, but
achieves significant gain in fairness performance.
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